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Abstract 
This paper tracks the history of sectoral saving and borrowing in the US 
economy over the past 50 years. We show that the financial imbalances 
that erupted in the financial crisis of 2008 were long in the making and 
preceded the emergence of global imbalances in the 2000s. These new 
dynamics in the household sector were already apparent in the 1990s, long 
before the deterioration in the US government balance or the current 
account balance and long before the arrival on the international stage of 
Chinese reserve accumulation. The record low household savings rate in 
the past decade was the product of two separate trends: a sharp fall in the 
asset acquisition of American households in the 1990s, and an explosion 
of mortgage borrowing in the 2000s. The American credit boom of the 
2000s had few direct links to reserve accumulation in emerging markets. 
The mortgage boom was financed by the US financial sector which 
intermediated foreign funds from private sources.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Discussions of the international economy and the global financial crisis give enormous 
emphasis to current account imbalances. Global imbalances such as those between the 
US and China or Germany and the rest of the EU are the object of much debate. Many 
central bankers, in particular, have embraced a reading of the global financial crisis in 
which imbalances and the surge in uphill net capital flows from poor to rich countries 
play a dominant role. In this view, a large and sudden rise of desired savings from 
developing countries, a savings glut (Bernanke 2005), flooded the US economy. Such 
explanations attribute a good part of the imbalance to events that took place outside the 
US and other developed countries. Yet the role of foreign capital in the US credit boom 
remains an area of much debate. What were the exact channels through which the reserve 
hunger of emerging markets fueled the housing boom in America? How did savings and 
investment patterns in the U.S. economy change with the influx of foreign savings?  
It is widely understood that at the international level, one country’s current 
account deficit is another country’s surplus. Therefore, for example, a change in the 
American current account deficit will be matched by changes elsewhere.  At the national 
level too, a change in the current account deficit, a nation’s net financial investment with 
the rest of the world, will be reflected in adjustments to saving by one or more sectors of 
the domestic economy. Since the net financial investment of all sectors (including the 
financial and the foreign sectors) must sum to zero, changes in one sector must lead to 
changes elsewhere in the economy. We can therefore study the evolution of global 
imbalances through the lens of sectoral financial balances in the US economy. This 
provides us with a new and potentially more informative perspective on the role of global 
and domestic factors in the making of America’s financial imbalances. 
Our financial balances based approach meshes with other contributions arguing 
that for a better understanding of global imbalances, we have to look beyond the study of 
net flows of capital (as measured in the current account and implicit in the savings glut 
hypothesis) and focus on the underlying gross flows of capital (Borio and Disyatat 2011; 
Shin 2011). In today’s world economy, net flows of capital are dwarfed by the underlying 
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gross inflows and outflows of capital.1
The present paper extends this focus on gross savings flows to a sectoral study of 
the US economy over the past 50 years.  Our goal is to delve deeper than the usual 
generalizations about the decline in savings rates and the increase in foreign borrowing in 
an effort to understand the causes and consequences of the American role in the global 
imbalances debate.  We will show that the relationships are more nuanced than the twin 
deficit terminology introduced in the 1980s when the US first encountered large current 
account and government deficits. Our data for the household, non-financial business and 
government sectors show substantial shifts in the financing patterns within the US 
economy that could have been interpreted as an early warning sign for financial stability 
risks (Eichner, Kohn and Palumbo 2010). 
 In the US case, gross inflows of capital in 2007 
were approximately $2.1 trillion while gross outflows of capital reached $1.4 trillion. 
This resulted in a net inflow of foreign capital (equal to the current account deficit) of 
$710 billion. Moreover, the gross financing flows do not have to align with trade flows. 
For instance, European savers can finance American deficits vis-à-vis Asia despite a 
balanced trade account between Europe and the U.S. Authors such as Obstfeld (2012) as 
well as Lane and McQuade (2013) have accordingly questioned the usefulness of the 
current account for an understanding the causes of the 2008 crisis and the drivers of 
financial fragility more generally. Jorda, Schularick and Taylor (2011) have shown that in 
advanced economies, current account imbalances are not a particularly reliable warning 
signal for financial crises, but credit growth is. 
Specifically, we show that the America’s imbalances were long in the making. 
Long-standing patterns of inter-sectoral financial flows have dissolved in the past two 
decades. New dynamics in the household sector were apparent in the 1990s, before the 
deterioration in the US government balance or the current account balance and long 
before the arrival on the international stage of Chinese reserve accumulation. From this 
perspective, the decade of the 1990s – when rising equity wealth led to a sharp drop in 
active savings – was as crucial for the making of American imbalances as the 2000s 
                                                 
1 In the first globalization, before 1914, gross flows corresponded much more closely to net flows of 
capital; see Obstfeld and Taylor (2004) and Schularick (2006). 
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when household borrowing accelerated sharply against the background of much reduced 
active savings. Our key results can be summarized as follows.  
First, the deterioration of the US current account was mainly driven by the 
worsening financial balance of the household sector and temporary swings in the federal 
budget deficit. The business sector was, largely, a passive bystander that did not borrow 
meaningfully from other sectors. Unlike most textbook models suggest, the American 
business sector is largely self-financing and does not depend on (net) intermediation of 
savings from other sectors. The substantial worsening of the household financial position 
got underway in the mid-1990s when households’ acquisition of financial assets fell 
dramatically. It deteriorated further in subsequent years when the unprecedented growth 
of mortgage borrowing occurred at a time of much reduced active savings by households. 
When record low active savings met the housing credit boom of the 2000s, the overall 
financial balance of the U.S. economy went deep into the red. 
Second, the foreign sector played an increasingly large role in recent decades as 
global financial integration proceeded at a rapid pace. Two sources of foreign capital 
inflows have been dominant: official inflows, reserve accumulation, into government 
securities, and private inflows into fixed income securities issued predominantly by U.S. 
financial companies. Foreign direct and equity investments play no important part in the 
overall picture. 
Lastly, the American credit bubble of the 2000s was financed by private capital. 
On a flow basis, reserve accumulation by foreign governments played virtually no direct 
role in the financing of the American credit bubble of the 2000s. The U.S. financial sector 
provided the financing for mortgage-hungry country. Wall Street fed the credit hunger of 
the American economy by borrowing from other households and by issuing debt 
liabilities in international financial markets; but it was the foreign private sector, not 
foreign governments, that provided most of the fuel for the fire. Chinese purchases of 
Treasury securities helped fund the war in Iraq at low cost, but the domestic credit boom 
was a story that was homemade, albeit with some support from (mainly) European 
creditors to American financial institutions. Our results here stand in clear opposition to 
arguments that link the bubble in US housing markets in the 2000s with the global glut of 
savings (Bernanke 2005), at least as far as the direction of capital flows is concerned. 
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Our paper does not aim to speak to the debate about the causes and consequences 
of global imbalances that has blossomed in recent years (Mendoza et al. 2009; Caballero 
et al. 2008; Caroll and Jeanne 2008). Nor are we interested in the question whether 
America’s current account deficit is of the “good” or “bad” variety. Blanchard and 
Milesi-Ferretti (2011) discuss deficits that arise for “good reasons” such as a promising 
economic outlook or high investment and those that have “bad” origins such as financial 
distortions, incomplete markets or misguided policies regarding national savings. The 
goal of this article is to shed new light on the financial flows underlying America’s 
imbalances and track their development over half a century of economic history.  
The structure of this paper is as follows. In the next section, we describe our data 
sources: the recently revised National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) and the 
financial flows from the Flow of Funds (FoF) accounts. In section 3, we trace the 
evolution of sectoral savings and investment balances over the past 50 years. In the 
following section, we go beyond changes in net financial balances and look at the 
underlying financial flows. In section five, we complement our treatment of 50 years of 
U.S. macroeconomic history by examining the development of sectoral debt and net 
worth. The last section presents some concluding thoughts.  
 
 
2. DATA 
 
There are two largely independent sources of data on savings and investment in 
the US: the National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) and the Flow of Funds 
Accounts (FoF). NIPA takes the familiar income accounting approach that defines 
savings as the difference between income and expenditure. The flow of funds approach 
measures saving from financial flows. In the FoF accounts, saving is net financial 
investment or the difference between the net acquisition of financial assets and the net 
increase in liabilities. Conceptually, net financial investment plus net investment in 
physical assets are the same as saving from NIPA.  After correcting for some for some 
differences in definitions and accounting treatment, the two measures should be identical 
although difficulties in measurement result in sometimes large discrepancies.  Both NIPA 
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and FoF provide information for saving in the major sectors of the economy: households, 
government, business and the rest of the world (foreign sector) although FoF has greater 
sectoral detail, particularly for the financial sector.   
The NIPA are more commonly used and most readers will be familiar with the 
overall structure of the accounts. However, our examination of sector by sector savings 
balances motivates our interest in specific financial flows in order to understand changes 
in the overall aggregates. For example, NIPA tells us nothing about the increase in 
leverage in the business sector and the increasing role of mortgage financing. For such 
information we turn to the FoF which provides considerable detail about the financial 
flows by type of asset as well as information on asset balances (stocks).   
The NIPA follows the same national accounting structure used around the world.  
FoF accounting structures are less common in other countries and less familiar to 
economists in the US although the Federal Reserve has published FoF accounts for over 
50 years.  In 1993, the statistical groups at several international financial institutions 
recommended a framework for national accounts that includes both financial and real 
data. The US introduced its integrated macroeconomic accounts in 2006 (Bond et. al 
2007) which draws on data from both NIPA and FoF. Our data are taken from the 
original sources, which include more detail; the specific web references are found in an 
appendix detailing the data sources and vintages used. 
 
 
3. THE EVOLUTION OF SECTORAL SAVINGS AND INVESTMENT BALANCES, 1960-2010 
 
Discussion of global imbalances usually starts with the observation that the 
current account balance (CA) is simply the difference between national savings (S) and 
gross domestic investment (I):  CA = S-I.  Panel A of Figure 1 shows the decline of 
national savings as a percent of GDP in the US and, given a broadly stable investment 
rate, the concomitant widening of the current account deficit that takes center stage in the 
debate about the causes of the financial crises and the imbalances in the world economy. 
 There is another way of looking at the current account balance (Wachtel, 1991); it 
is also the (negative of) net financial investment of the rest of the world in the US, one of 
 
 
6 
several sectoral financial balances.  That is, the net financial investment of each domestic 
sector is the difference between its saving and investment:  NFIi  = Si – Ii where the 
sectors, i, are non-financial business, households, finance and government.  Further, the 
sum of all the sectoral imbalances, the net financial investment of the domestic sectors 
and the rest of the world is zero: CA + ∑i NFIi  = 0.   Thus, for a full view of the 
evolution of savings and investment imbalances we look at the net financial investment 
of each sector as shown in Panel B of Figure 1.  Although the variability of the sectoral 
balances makes it difficult to discern the trends, a few structural development show 
through. Changes in the imbalances of the household sector are as important as the 
government and foreign sector deficits.   
 
Figure 1 
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Note: Panel A shows gross domestic investment, national savings and the current account balance
from the NIPA. Panel B shows the net financial investment of each sector.
Figure 1: U.S. Saving and Investment as % of GDP
 
 
 The big picture story is that, with the partial exception of the business sector, the 
sectors of the US economy have witnessed marked changes in their savings and 
investment balances during the past 50 years. Household saving peaked in the early 
1980s. After brief surpluses during the late years of the Clinton administration, the 
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government sector financial balance turned negative in the 2000s. The business sector 
was not an important net borrower over the past 50 years and typically ran savings-
investment balances of less than 1% of GDP. In the 2000s in the years before the 
financial crisis, all domestic sectors of the US economy were in deficit. Only the foreign 
sector supplied funds to the US economy on a net basis. 
 Table 1 summarizes the history of sectoral balances using data from the recently 
revised NIPA accounts for each of the past five decades.2
Both the business sector and the foreign sector saw very little changes in this 
decade. Gross investment (capital expenditure) rates have stayed constant over the past 
30 years, but net investment has fallen slightly relative to GDP, mainly owing to higher 
depreciation charges.  Business investment today has a larger share of computers, 
vehicles and other short-lived capital goods than it did during the era of large-scale 
industrial plants. With higher depreciation charges, more investment is financed 
internally and there is less need to borrow. 
 In the 1960s, American 
business investment exceeded the savings of the same sector by a relatively small 
amount, equivalent to about 0.8% of GDP. The average annual borrowing requirement by 
the government was about 3% of GDP and the foreign balance was close to zero. The 
main provider of (net) savings to the other sectors and here mainly to the government was 
the household sector. American families’ savings exceeded their investment into housing 
and other durables by 4.6% of GDP. The savings surplus of the household sector grew in 
the 1970s to 5.3%, compensating for a worsening of the government balance.  
In the 1980s, the decline of the household sectoral balance commenced. A process 
began that has become a key feature of America’s imbalances: a continuous decline of 
the household balance from 5% in the 1970s to 4% in the 1980s, 2.5% in the 1990s and 
essentially zero in the 2000s. Neither the business balance nor the government balance 
moved much on average. The mirror image of the decline in the household balance was 
the widening deficit with the rest of the world. American households ceased to be the 
main provider of savings to the other sectors of the US economy, and the foreign sector 
assumed that role.  
                                                 
2 The figures in the tables only run to 2008 as we want track the development of imbalances in the run-up 
to the crisis, not the post-crisis adjustment. 
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 Table 1: Sectoral Balances, ratio to GDP: 1960-2008 (NIPA data) 
  Business Household Government Rest of World 
1960s -0.008 0.046 -0.032 0.006 
1970s -0.009 0.053 -0.042 0.001 
1980s -0.008 0.043 -0.050 -0.016 
1990s -0.002 0.025 -0.037 -0.014 
2000s -0.009 0.001 -0.039 -0.047 
Note: The table shows the net financial investment for each sector from the NIPA. Data 
are arithmetic averages of annual ratios by decade: 1960-69, 1970-79,…, 2000-08.  
  
 
 
4. GROSS SECTORAL LENDING AND BORROWING: THE VIEW FROM THE FLOW OF 
FUNDS ACCOUNTS 
 
While sectoral savings and investment imbalances illuminate the big changes in 
savings and investment behavior individual of individual sectors, one has to go a step 
further and zoom in on the underlying gross flows of financial funds to understand the 
driving forces of the process. In the following, we will turn to the Flow of Funds accounts 
that provide details about the gross acquisition of financial assets (lending) and the 
incurrence of financial liabilities (borrowing) which correspond to the sectoral 
imbalances between savings and investment. The reason behind this is simple. Whenever 
a sector invests more than it saves, it must borrow funds from other sectors. If one adds 
up all financial transactions (borrowing and lending) between, say, the household sector 
and all other sectors, the resulting sum of net financial investment of the household sector 
should be identical to the savings and investment balance discussed in the previous 
section. As mentioned above, this financial balances based approach, focusing on the 
underlying gross lending and borrowing decisions, meshes well with other recent 
contributions arguing that gross flows of capital contain valuable information about the 
build-up of financial fragility (Borio and Disyatat 2011; Shin 2011).  
Table 2 summarizes the key trends using the flow of funds data. There are some 
small differences to the savings-investment balances from NIPA discussed above, but the 
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overall picture is similar. Net financial investment of the household sector fell strongly 
and was mirrored almost one for one by a rise in the net financial investment of the 
foreign sector. Both the government and the business sector exhibit no similarly clear 
trend. In the following, we will examine each domestic sector individually, tracing the 
evolution of the composition of American sectoral balances in the last five decades.  
 
Table 2: Sectoral Balances, ratio to GDP, 1960-2008 (FoF data)  
    1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s 
Households  0.037 0.048 0.053 0.021 -0.017 
 Assets 0.073 0.096 0.104 0.065 0.053 
  Liabilities 0.036 0.048 0.051 0.044 0.070 
Business sector  -0.027 -0.037 -0.030 -0.002 -0.013 
 Assets 0.025 0.049 0.054 0.056 0.065 
  Liabilities 0.052 0.086 0.084 0.058 0.078 
Foreign sector  -0.004 -0.001 0.012 0.015 0.049 
 Assets 0.007 0.016 0.025 0.048 0.089 
  Liabilities 0.011 0.017 0.014 0.033 0.040 
Government sector  -0.011 -0.020 -0.045 -0.025 -0.027 
 Assets 0.011 0.018 0.020 0.008 0.014 
  Liabilities 0.021 0.039 0.065 0.033 0.041 
Note: The table shows the net sectoral balance and its composition (each balance 
is the difference between the increases in financial assets and liabilities).  Data are 
decadal averages, the average of the annual ratios by decade: 1960-69, 1970-
79,…,2000-08.  The data are from the FoF accounts and differ from the NIPA 
sectoral balances shown in Table 1. 
 
 
4.1 Household sector 
 
 Net financial investment by the household sector was strongly positive in the 
1960s and 1970s, which is curious to some degree because real returns faced by 
household savers in this period were more often than not negative. There is a strong 
precautionary motive for households’ savings, which increased with overall uncertainty 
about the economy (Juster and Wachtel, 1972).  After reaching a peak in the early 1980s, 
the overall savings rate started to decline, as seen before. The fall in was mainly due to a 
reduction in active savings – the acquisition of financial assets by households, as shown 
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in table 2. This decline was due to a sharp decline of deposit growth and a steady fall in 
pension contributions as shown in Figure 2. Pension contributions declined from around 
5% of GDP in the 1980s to around 2% by the mid-2000s. Similarly, deposit acquisition 
averaged about 4% of GDP in the 1980s. By the mid-1990s, it had fallen to zero, before 
recovering somewhat in the 2000s. Putting money in the bank was no longer an attractive 
option to many Americans. To a lesser degree, bond and equity purchases also declined 
in the 1990s. Moreover, during stock market booms, US households were large net seller 
of equities – in the mid-1980s, late 1990s and again after 2005. 
The long decline in the active savings of households ended in the late 1990s at 
which point we also observe a marked shift on the liability side of the household balance 
sheet. In short, in addition to a much-reduced rate of accumulation of financial assets, US 
households started borrowing strongly after 1998. The rapid increase in the incurrence of 
financial liabilities (borrowing) following the ongoing fall in the acquisition of financial 
assets (saving) resulted in an unprecedented deterioration in the overall financial balance 
of the household sector in the 2000s. For the first time in modern American history, the 
household sector, typically the provider of savings for the rest of the economy, started 
running a financial deficit as can be seen from Figure 2. 
The reasons behind the surge in private borrowing are not hard to identify. 
Mortgage borrowing was by far the most important component of the run-up in 
household debt over the past 15 years. Mortgage borrowing increased rapidly from less 
than 2% of GDP in 1995 to 8% in ten years and reached a peak of close to 10% of GDP. 
Of course, the run-up in household borrowing occurred at the same time as the boom in 
household investment in housing which crossed the 5% of GDP line in the 2000s.  The 
household sector borrowed for two reasons: first, to finance new investment in housing 
and house improvement. Second, households took on mortgage debt to finance 
consumption expenditure by withdrawing some of the increased equity in housing due to 
price appreciation (Greenspan and Kennedy 2008; Cooper 2009, 2010). 
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Figure 2: Composition of Household Sectoral Balance as % of GDP
 
 
Table 3 summarizes the main changes in saving and borrowing behavior of 
American households. In the 1960s to 1980s, households acquired deposits and bonds as 
part of their active savings. Both forms of savings fell sharply in the 1990s but stabilized 
in the 2000s. The fact that net financial investment continued to deteriorate in the 2000s 
was due to the jump in mortgage borrowing. Contrary to frequent fears, consumer credit 
has not increased meaningfully (relative to GDP) in the past five decades. 
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Table 3: Composition of Household Sector Balance, Ratio to GDP, FoF Data 
    1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s 
Household Sector Assets 0.073 0.096 0.104 0.065 0.053 
 Deposits 0.038 0.053 0.040 0.004 0.029 
 Bonds 0.010 0.010 0.022 0.011 0.006 
 Equities -0.010 -0.007 -0.011 0.008 -0.017 
  Pension 0.032 0.038 0.051 0.038 0.030 
Household Sector Liabilities 0.036 0.048 0.051 0.044 0.070 
 Mortgages 0.022 0.031 0.036 0.029 0.058 
  Consumer Credit 0.010 0.013 0.010 0.010 0.010 
Note: The table shows the composition of the household sector balance.  Data are 
decadal averages.  Data are decadal averages, the average of the annual ratios by 
decade: 1960-69, 1970-79,…, 2000-08. 
 
 
4.2 Business sector 
 
 For most of the post-WWII period, the non-financial business sector ran a small 
financial deficit. Business sector investment typically exceeded sectoral savings by about 
1% of GDP according to the NIPA data. In the Flow of Funds data, the deficit is slightly 
larger, but the errors and omissions can be large. Yet also according to Flow of Funds 
data, by the late 1980s and, by 1990, the US business sector essentially stopped investing 
more than it saved.3
However, business has not reduced its gross borrowing in a significant way.  
Figure 3 shows that despite wide year to year variation, corporate bond issuance and bank 
borrowing have not declined. Bank loans have declined somewhat over the decades, but 
increased issuance of bonds has substituted for this to a large degree. As a result, gross 
borrowing by the American business sector has not changed all that much. 
  From 1990 until the onset of the financial crisis, net financial 
investment by the business sector hovered around zero. 
Yet as the incurrence of financial liabilities by the business sector has not changed 
dramatically, the necessary corollary of overall net financial investment of the business 
sector that hovers around zero is that the acquisition of financial assets has increased by a 
                                                 
3 National Income and Product Accounts and Flow of Funds data differ slightly with regard to the timing of 
the transition, but both tell fundamentally the same story. 
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corresponding amount. As shown in Figure 3, American business has indeed increased its 
acquisition of financial assets, in particular shares in money market mutual funds.  Table 
4 summarizes the observation that might seem paradoxical at first sight: American 
companies increasingly borrow long and lend short – the opposite of the function 
typically played by the banking system.  
 
Table 4: Composition of Business Sector Balance, Ratio to GDP, FoF Data 
    1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s 
Business Sector Assets 0.025 0.049 0.054 0.056 0.065 
 Deposits 0.003 0.007 0.005 0.006 0.005 
  Other 0.016 0.029 0.036 0.035 0.038 
Business Sector 
Liabilities 0.052 0.086 0.084 0.058 0.078 
 Bonds 0.010 0.012 0.015 0.015 0.015 
 Loans 0.027 0.038 0.037 0.011 0.031 
 Equity 0.002 0.004 -0.012 -0.007 -0.020 
  Other 0.012 0.032 0.040 0.025 0.043 
Note: The table shows the composition of the financial balance for the non-financial 
business sector from the FoF account.  Data are decadal averages, the average of the 
annual ratios by decade: 1960-69, 1970-79,…, 2000-08. 
 
 
 How can we understand this trend? In the early 1990s and again in the early 
2000s, real short-term interest rates were negative for extended periods; under these 
circumstances, the business sector may find it advantageous to maintain greater liquidity. 
Further, although the flow of funds classifies all financial intermediaries, in addition to 
banks, as part of the financial sector, it is possible that an element in the development of 
the shadow banking system was the increase in intermediary activity among business 
entities.  As a result, the business sector, like the financial sector itself, shows large and 
offsetting acquisitions for financial assets and incurrence of liabilities. Much of this 
intersectoral intermediation can be due to corporate mergers and acquisitions and share 
buybacks. As we will see below, the rest of the world does not only lend to the US, it also 
borrows from it and much of that borrowing could be in the form of cross border 
investments by US businesses. 
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 Finally, a look at net equity issuance of the business sector underlines once again 
how the financial behavior of American business has changed in the last few decades. For 
most of the 1960 and 1970s, U.S. business issued equity on a net basis. Further, as seen in 
the last panel of figure 3, that net equity issuance was relatively stable over the cycle. 
Starting in the mid-1980s, the net issuance of equity dipped below zero – companies were 
reducing equity liabilities on average – and stayed negative for the next 25 years (with 
one short exception in the 1990s).  Importantly, there are clear indications that net equity 
issuance has become strongly pro-cyclical in the past two decades. Companies sharply 
reduce equity in boom times, presumably by using part of their profits for share 
buybacks. In 2007, the reduction in equity liabilities of the business sector reached an 
astonishing $780 billion or about 5.6% of GDP. Overall, the trends in equity issuance 
mesh well with the overall themes of this section: the business sector has ceased to be a 
net importer of savings from other sectors. Its net financial investment is very close to 
zero. Companies have reduced outstanding equity and in some respects, their behavior 
resembles the financial sector, as we will discuss below.  
 
 
 
15 
-.0
5
0
.0
5
.1
.1
5
1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Net Assets Liabilities
Panel A: Sectoral Balance
-2
0
2
4
1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Bonds Loans
Panel B: Borrowing
0
.5
1
1.
5
2
D
ep
os
its
1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Panel C: Deposit Acquisition
-6
-4
-2
0
2
N
et
 e
qu
ity
 is
su
an
ce
1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Panel D: Net Equity Issuance
Note: Panel A shows the composition of the financial balance of the non-financial business sector.
Panel B shows the major components of the increase in liabilities: bank borrowing and bond issuance.
Panel C shows business sector acquisitions of deposits and Panel D shows the sectors net equity
issuance (new issues less buybacks). Data are from the FoF accounts.
Figure 3: Composition of Business Sectoral Balance as % of GDP
 
 
 
4.3 Foreign sector  
 
 The foreign sector has become the most important lender to the American 
economy. The growing integration of global capital markets has opened up a new source 
of funds for the increasingly savings-starved US economy.  However, Figure 4 shows 
that the story is more complex than the simple observation that the current account deficit 
is a source of saving.  The acquisition of financial assets by the rest of the world in the 
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US grew rapidly from somewhat less than 5% of GDP in the 1980s to over 10% prior to 
the financial crisis.  This is a larger swing than the increase in the current account deficit 
because foreign borrowing in the US has also increased strongly. 
The detail in the Flow of Funds accounts provides us with a more precise picture 
of the capital inflows – the flip side of the current account deficit -- that supply funds to 
the domestic sectors. While in the 1970s and 1980s, foreign buying of Treasury securities 
was the only meaningful foreign savings flow into the US, private sector inflows became 
more important in the late 1990s.  In the late 1990s, both fixed income and equity inflows 
averaged about 2% of GDP. Equity inflows fell sharply in the wake of the dotcom bubble 
and have not yet reached their previous highs. Nevertheless, the 1990s boom in foreign 
buying of US corporate and financial sector bonds continued. After 2001, foreign buying 
of treasury and agency securities also reached previously unprecedented levels. There had 
been short-lived spikes in foreign purchases of US government securities – in particular 
when interest rates peaked in the early 1970s and in the mid-1990s. Yet unlike in 
previous episodes the foreign inflow boom of the 2000s continued at a high level for 
almost a decade. Even during the crisis of 2008-09, foreign interest in treasuries remained 
high and inflows remained stable at around 3% of GDP. 
Figure 4 also illustrates another unappreciated feature of the capital inflow boom 
of the 2000s. Inflows to the private sector (foreign acquisitions of private sector 
securities) were as large, if not larger, than foreign inflows into US government 
securities. Inflow into the corporate bonds grew enormously, reaching 4% of GDP before 
the crisis, although equity inflows played a secondary role and hovered around 1% of 
GDP.  In net terms, purchases of foreign equities by Americans offset these large inflows.  
The most interesting interaction between the foreign sector and the domestic economy 
occurred in the financial sector, which is where we turn next.  
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Figure 4: Composition of Foreign Sector Balance as % of GDP
 
 
4.4 Financial sector  
 
 The Flow of Funds accounts provide an additional perspective on the astonishing 
growth of financial intermediation in the past three decades.  As shown in Figure 5, both 
asset acquisition and liability incurrence of the financial sector have grown strongly and 
steadily with the exception of the 1980s. In the 1960s and 1970s, the US financial sector 
intermediated savings flows on average of about 15% of GDP. Since 1990, the average 
savings flow has been about 25% of GDP and it reached a peak of almost 30% before the 
crisis.  Of course, gross intermediary activity fell to below zero in the financial 
depression of 2009-10.  
The Flow of Funds data allow us to examine the composition of this astonishing 
growth of the financial sector. Not surprisingly, on the asset side, the growth has mainly 
come from mortgage lending. The key role performed by the financial sector in the recent 
decade was to channel savings from the household sector, the business sector and the 
foreign sector into mortgage borrowing by American households. The annual increase in 
mortgages held by the financial sector increased from under 2% of GDP during the 
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recession of 1990-91 to more than 10% by the mid-2000s. There is evidence of a 
generalized credit boom as other forms of financial sector credit – unsecured consumer 
loans, business loans and corporate bond buying – also expanded relative to previous 
times. Nevertheless, the main driver was the tripling of mortgage lending in the 2000s 
relative to the 1990s. 
 
-.1
0
.1
.2
.3
1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Financial sector net Assets Liabilities
Panel A: Sectoral balance
-1
0
-5
0
5
10
1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Mortgages Other
Panel B: Lending
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and other lending. Data are from the FoF accounts.
Figure 5: Composition of Financial Sector Balance as % of GDP
 
 
How did the financial sector fund the mortgage credit boom? A look at the 
liability side of the financial sector in Figure 6 shows that the main source of financial 
funding was non-deposit borrowing such as the issuances of bonds and other paper, with 
deposits coming a distant second. The growth in non-deposit borrowing was facilitated 
by financial market developments such as the Repo market and money market funds.  
A closer look at the intermediary role of the financial sector indicates that a 
number of long-standing relationships dissolved over the past two decades. For most of 
the postwar period, the financial sector issued fewer bonds than it bought; deposits were a 
more important funding source. This is consistent with a traditional model of a financial 
intermediary sector that issues (short-term) deposits and uses them to buy (long-term) 
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bonds issued by the owners of investment projects, primarily the corporate business 
sector. In fact, over time purchases of business sector bonds grew in importance and were 
a substitute for direct lending in the form of bank loans. Yet after 2002-03, the opposite 
was the case. The financial sector began to issue more liabilities than it acquired. This 
dramatic shift is shown in Figure 6. By 2005, the financial sector issued about five times 
as many new liabilities as the non-financial business sector.  
These trends illustrate the dramatic shift in the funding mix of the financial sector. 
Whereas deposits were the dominant source of funds for the financial sector until the 
mid-1980s, financial sector bond issuance and money market mutual funds play a much 
more central role today. Such new forms of non-monetary funding of the financial sector 
have loosened considerably the link between money and credit (Schularick and Taylor 
2012). Since the 1980s, banks’ access to non-monetary sources of finance has become an 
important factor for aggregate credit provision. The increasing dependence of the 
financial system on access to wholesale funding also means that central banks are forced 
to underwrite the entire funding market in times of distress in order to avoid the collapse 
of the banking system as experienced in 2008/09. The lender of last resort now must step 
in to confront non-deposit bank runs (Gorton and Metrick 2012).  
Although the financial sector credit boom of the 2000s was a domestic 
phenomenon, the foreign sector was an important enabling factor. The expansion of the 
financial sector, which was needed to sustain the boom in mortgage lending, was 
increasingly supported by foreign purchases of private sector bonds. As we have 
mentioned before, the foreign sector was not only a major buyer of government 
securities, it also purchased private sector securities. Foreign buying of private sector 
bonds, filling the domestic funding gap of the US financial sector, was an important 
ingredient of the capital inflow boom of the past decade. Panel B of figure 6 shows that in 
the 2000s, the foreign sector emerged as a major source of funds for the expansion of the 
American financial sector. Yet it is also apparent that the foreign official (central 
banking) sector has little to do with the borrowing spree of the U.S. financial sector. The 
latter turned to foreign private savings to satisfy the insatiable mortgage hunger of 
American households.  
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Figure 6: Financial Sector Borrowing and Foreign Lending as % of GDP
 
 
4.5 Government sector 
 
The Flow of Funds story for the government sector is relatively straightforward. 
Federal government deficits drive the sector’s net financial investment since state and 
local governments are for the most part required to balance their operating budgets. 
However, the government sector, particulary at the state and local level, also acts as a 
financial intermediary that both issues liablies and accumulates financial assets. Figure 7 
shows that financial asset purchases by the government sector often run around 3% of 
GDP but without any discernible recent trends. 
 With regard to the trends in lending and borrowing the flow of funds tell the well-
known story of the sequence of US public sector deficits in the past 50 years. Budget 
deficits widened sharply under the Reagan administration in the 1980s and stayed around 
5% of GDP until the early 1990s. The deficits were closed in the boom of the 1990s, but 
the Bush tax cuts and the post 9/11 military activity led to renewed deterioration of the 
federal deficit in the 2000s. Finally, the deficits incurred after the global financial crisis 
were unprecedented in peace time.   
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Figure 7: Composition of Government Sector Balances as % of GDP
 
 
4.6 Summary 
 
Closer analyis of the trends in individual sectors gives a picture that is 
considerably more granular than the standard twin deficit view and, in some respects, 
challenges conventional wisdom about the tight links between reserve accumulation 
around the world and the American credit binge. The biggest change in financial behavior 
in the past two decades has come from the household sector. Two significant trends 
emerged in the last two decades. First, in the 1990s American households sharply 
reduced their active savings which by the end of the decade stabilized at an historically 
low level where they remained roughly for the following decade. A second trend that 
quickly gathered speed in the 2000s is the rapid expansion of household borrowing, 
predominantly in the form of mortgages. Against the background of much reduced 
savings, the household sector started to run a financial deficit from 1998 on. In other 
words, it imported savings on a net basis from the other sectors. The financial sector 
intermediated the growing hunger of households for loanable funds from other sectors. 
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As the business sectors’ savings closely mirrored investment and the government turned 
into a net borrower after 2000, only the foreign sector could provide the necessary funds. 
Yet these funds were private, not official.  
Our examination of trends show some important features of the role of foreign 
sector inflows to the US in the last two decades. Most attention is given to the last decade 
when the Bush era increase in the government deficit coicicided with the start of rapid 
foreign exchange reserve accumulation by China. The overwhelming share of foreign 
official inflows went into Treasury securities. However, a closer look shows that the 
decline in private sector US saving and the increase in the current account deficit dates 
back to the 1990s.  
The increase in mortgage borrowing starting in the mid 1990s was financed by 
financial sector bond issuance (mortgage backed securities and pools). This is shown in 
Figure 8. The US financial sector tapped foreign savings; and the foreign private sector 
was the principal buyer of financial sector bond issues and the US financial sector itself 
absorbed the rest. Foreign official purchases of US assets linked to the accumulation of 
foreign exchange reserve in East Asia, did not play a major role in financing the credit 
hunger of American households. The credit boom in the US, the increase in the ratio of 
private debt to GDP, was driven by the growth of the domestic financial sector which 
increasingly relied on funds from foreign private capital inflows. At the risk of 
oversimplifying a complex picture, one could summarize that Beijing may have financed 
the war in Iraq while American and European private investors financed the mortgage 
bubble. In short, the U.S. credit boom that ended so badly was a product of financial 
gloablization in the private sector; it had little to do with capital inflows from foreign 
governments. The American credit boom of the past two decades was essentially driven 
by the private sector. 
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Figure 8: The Foreign Sector and U.S. Mortgage Markets as % of GDP
 
 
 
5. FROM FLOWS TO STOCKS 
 
 Our analysis of the history of American financial balances would not complete 
without a short look at the development of stocks of assets (wealth) and liabilities (debt). 
The main story here is a continuous increase in leverage, coming chiefly from the private 
sector.  The dramatic rise of leverage of the American economy is shown in Figure 9.   
Until the 1980s, business sector debts expanded rapidly, but from the 1980s onwards it 
was mainly the household sector that increased debt. Total business debt to GDP has 
been rising throughout the period, from less than 60% to almost 120%, an even larger 
increase than that shown for the government since 1980.  Government debt to GDP 
declined until the early 1980s, declined again in the 1990s and then rose sharply in the 
crisis.  Household debt to GDP was relatively constant until the early 1980s.  
 Total debt of the domestic non-financial sectors (both private and the overall 
total) has increased steadily over the last 50 years (Figure 9, Panel B). The debt to GDP 
ratio roughly doubled since 1960, rising from slighlty above 1.5 time annual income to 
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more than 3 times in 2010. However, there have been two episodes of rapid increase in 
overall leverage, for a decade starting in the mid 1970s and again for a decade starting in 
the late 1990s.  
An extensive literature on finance and economic growth shows that increased financial 
depth (the ratio of debt to GDP) and more developed financial intermediary institutions 
are associated with higher levels of economic growth. However, it is also the case that 
rapid increases in financial depth can be characterized as credit booms, which can lead to 
economic instability and financial crises (Wachtel, 2011). Moreover, Schularick and 
Taylor (2012) show that crisis risks are higher in larger financial systems. The distinction 
between growth enhancing financial deepening and destabilizing credit booms is not 
readily apparent. However, it seems safe to say that relative to its long run path, it is not 
evident that the credit boom of the past decades has led to acceleration in the trend rate of 
growth.  
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A corollary of the increasing financialization and higher leverage of the American 
economy, are the large swings in net worth that result from asset price fluctuations. As 
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liabilities are largely fixed in the short run, such declines in the value of assets result in 
equally large movements in net worth. From the perspective of American households, the 
gains during the boom years have more than compensated for the decline in active 
savings. From 1995 to 2000, the (unrealized) capital gains on households’ equity 
holdings were between 20% and 40% of GDP per year – a multiple of flow-based savings 
rates. Nonfinancial capital gains – chiefly stemming from the price appreciation of the 
housing stock – averaged about 5% of GDP over 1980-2000 before increasing sharply in 
the housing boom of the 2000s. During the peak years of the housing boom, wealth gains 
stemming from house price appreciation reached between 10% and 15% of annual GDP. 
Accumulating over a number of years, this led to a sizeable improvement of the net worth 
position of American households despite the decline in active savings, as can be seen in 
figure 10.  
Figure 10 shows the wealth position of the household sector (relative to 
disposable income). It varies widely as the value of equities and housing change. 
Household net wealth levels improved strongly in the late 1990s, driven mainly by the 
equity boom, and in the 2000s when a synchroneous surge in house and stock prices 
pushed net worth ratios sharply higher. The figure also illustrates the unprecedented 
nature of the post-2007 collapse. Never before in recent history have both housing and 
equity wealth collapsed at the same time to this extent. The collapse in house prices and 
the decline in equity wealth during the financial crisis has brought the net worth of 
American households back to the levels seen between 1960 and 1990 – about five times 
disposable income, but it has recovered since.4
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
4 This is only true for aggregates. As inequality has grown, the distribution of wealth is not the same as in 
previous decades. 
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Figure 10: Household Net Worth, Ratio to Disposable Income
 
 
 
 
6. CONCLUSION  
  
 
Our panoramic tour across 50 years of sectoral balances in the US economy yields 
a number of new and potentially important insights. Long-standing relationships in the 
financial structure of the US economy have dissolved in the past decades. Today’s 
patterns of financial intermediation bears, overall, only limited resemblance to textbook 
models where household savings are intermediated into business investments. American 
business has vastly expanded its financial relations with other sectors, but its financial 
balance is flat and the sector not a meaningful net borrower. Not only the business sector, 
but also American households have displayed a striking change in savings behavior. For 
the first time in modern history, households in the noughts have turned into net borrowers 
from other sectors and are no longer providing savings to the rest of the economy. The 
household sector has clearly seen the most dramatic shift in financial balances in the 
decades before the crisis. This shift in the household financial balance is connected to 
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trends that were underway long before the emergence of global imbalances and reserve 
accumulation in emerging markets. Already in the 1990s, American households 
dramatically reduced their acquisition of financial assets. Potentially in response to rising 
equity wealth during the stock market boom of the 1990s, households’ acquisition of 
financial assets dropped from about to 10% of GDP in the 1980s to slightly above zero in 
the late 1990s. Against the background of record low active savings rates, households 
started to borrow strongly after 1998 as the value of the housing stock appreciated and 
mortgage equity withdrawals helped sustain rapid consumption growth.  
 Finally, our study reveals a much looser link between global imbalances and the 
American credit boom than is often assumed. Our results here mesh with recent emphasis 
on gross, not net savings flows (Borio and Disyatat 2011; Shin 2011; Obstfeld 2012, 
Lane and McQuade 2013). The American financial sector increasingly intermediated 
foreign capital in order to finance the housing credit boom of the 1990s.  It fed the credit 
hunger of the American economy mainly by issuing debt liabilities in international 
financial markets; as a result, American financial institutions could finance a lending 
boom of historic proportions despite low domestic savings. The foreign private sector, 
not foreign governments, provided much of the fuel for the fire. Foreign official inflows 
went almost exclusively into Treasury securities while private investors bought bonds 
and other instruments by U.S. financial intermediaries. Those who are looking for 
international drivers of the American credit bubble should not look to Beijing and 
Riyadh, but to international private capital markets. The capital inflow bonanza of the 
2000s that enabled the rapid build-up in leverage (Chinn and Frieden 2011) was primarily 
a private sector inflow. Beijing financed the war in Iraq at low cost while Wall Street, 
foreign banks and private investors fueled the housing bubble.   
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APPENDIX: DATA SOURCES 
 
1. National Income and Product Accounts 
National and Sectoral Saving and Investment Balances: Table 5.1. “Saving and 
Investment by Sector”, Time period: 1960-2012;  
The data used here are from the release on Aug 29, 2013, and include the results of the 
2013 Comprehensive Revision of the National Income and Product Accounts. They can 
be retrieved online from the Bureau of Economic Analysis: 
https://www.bea.gov/national/nipaweb/SS_Data/Section5All_Hist.xls 
 
            
2.  Flow of Funds 
Sectoral financial balances and their composition are taken from the Z.1 Flow of Funds 
Accounts of the United States; 
The data used here are from the March 7, 2013, release and can be retrieved online from 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System:  
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/ 
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